Hearing on the Nomination of John Negroponte

From The New York Times - April 12, 2005

Page 27, Page 28

Questions By Senator, Jon Corzine

CORZINE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And let me welcome Ambassador Negroponte.

And let me also say that I think, for all of us, at least those people I represent, we want to express our gratitude for your long service to our nation, particularly your most recent efforts, both in Iraq and in the United Nations.

CORZINE: Also, I would be remiss if I didn't say one of the reasons you're sitting here certainly flows from a lot of the activities of people who come from my home state, Governor Kean, in particular, with regard to the 9/11 Commission; but maybe even more importantly, the families, some of whom were -- 700 who lost their lives. And I commend them because I do think this is the proper step in the direction that we're taking. And I do believe that you have the experience and the opportunity to really lead here.

But all that said, let me express a reservation that really flows -- my reservation -- and I'm not going to change my view on this -- but much of the analysis that we've seen from the 9/11 Commission, now the WMD, from the reports of this committee itself, dealt with collection and analysis. It seems to me that there is a third leg to that stool and it's the use of intelligence and how that is presented.

I thought Senator Levin's recital of a series of issues and intelligence that backed up the intelligence community's view as regard to the Mohammad Atta meetings gets at the point.

Isn't the right answer -- and I think you said crossing the bridge when we got there was the ultimate answer if there were public statements by senior public policymakers.

Shouldn't the right answer going to the senior policymakers when there is serious contradiction with the intelligence (inaudible) when we're making advocacy for policy? Some of that could be done behind closed doors, of course. Some can be done in Intelligence Committees so that we're not making policy decisions with erroneous decisions and we can avoid it.

But it seems to me that it is almost imperative that the director of national intelligence -- what's the term? -- speak truth to power or whatever the phrase is will be absolutely a requirement that those contradictions in analyses are presented in a way. Isn't that the response?

NEGROPONTE: And in answering Senator Levin, I think in part at least, Senator, I was trying to go to that. I was trying to say, from everything we've learned, from the experience we've had in the past several years, we don't want a repetition of this kind of situation. We don't want to have the Curveball situation again.

And one of the ways you're going to avoid it is to improve the quality of the analytical product, make sure it's comprehensive and lay the truth before the policymakers of our country, and try to avert the kind of -- the hypothesis he described.

CORZINE: Collection and analysis, the work and the organization, which is going to be an enormous task. And I more than believe you're up to that.

But the fact is that even when we come through with that process, sometimes there will be strongly held opinions that are colored by selectivity, colored by interpretation, potentially.

And isn't it the job of the independent arbiter of intelligence to make sure that the community that is most responsible for assessing those knows that those contradictions with what is said in public -- and maybe we'll never ever have that again; maybe because our collection and analysis will be so good that no one will ever have preconceived or group-think ideas come to fruition, that it will take -- but if they do, will it be the responsibility of the DNI to challenge that privately? I'm asking for political confrontation.

NEGROPONTE: Yes, I have no problem whatsoever with that. And I also, I believe, said in my statement that intelligence is not a panacea, nor is it policy. But should the DNI place before the president and others other decision-makers the fullest and best possible analytical accounting that is available and identify the gaps in knowledge and talk about judgments as to reliability or unreliability and the various gradations and all of that? Yes. It has to be put before the decision-makers.

CORZINE: I'll end here because I think this whole issue of independent analysis, and making sure that the testing of hypotheses and knowing where holes are and contradictory perspectives on unknowables, leads to probabilistic analysis. And if that is not practiced, we get into certainty.

And I hope that as time unfolds, this committee and others will ask, within those probabilistic kinds of analyses, these most difficult questions.